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ST A TE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL D ECISION NOTICE 
Name: Mayo, Marcus Facility: Watertown CF 
NY SID 
DIN: 17-B-3121 




Watertown, New York 13601 
05-215-19 B 
Decision appealed: April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15 months. 
Board Member(s) Drake, Berliner 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived October 25, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recomme~dation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~firmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determfoation is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written .., 
r easons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te findings of 
. the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ID 'ollW i. 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) . 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Mayo, Marcus DIN: 17-B-3121  
Facility: Watertown CF AC No.:  05-215-19 B 
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Appellant was sentenced to two to four years upon his conviction of CPW in the third 
degree.  In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board 
denying release and imposing a 15-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the decision is 
arbitrary and capricious because the Board failed to meaningfully consider required factors such 
as his positive institutional adjustment and release plans; (2) the decision is arbitrary and capricious 
because the Board relied exclusively on the instant offense and Appellant’s criminal history; and 
(3) the Board failed to rebut the presumption that he is ready for release pursuant to his EEC.  
These arguments are without merit. 
 
Generally, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted unless the Board determines that 
an inmate meets three standards: “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he 
will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with 
the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  The Board must 
consider factors relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s 
institutional record and criminal behavior.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Whereas here the 
inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society.  
Correction Law § 805; Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 
1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  An EEC does not 
automatically guarantee release or eliminate consideration of the statutory factors, including the 
instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 
N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 
1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 
N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006). 
 
While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016).  In the 
absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must 
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be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 
A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense where Appellant was found with a handgun 
following an argument with his girlfriend; Appellant’s out of state criminal history; his substance 
abuse history; his institutional record including completion  and vocational trade, receipt 
of an EEC, educational efforts, outstanding program needs and absence of new discipline; and 
release plans to work, explore the military or return to school for mechanic.  The Board also had 
before it and considered, among other things, the pre-sentence investigation report, Appellant’s 
case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and letters of support. 
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the applicable standards for release.  In reaching its conclusion, 
the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, Appellant’s prior criminal history, elevated scores 
in the COMPAS instrument, that Appellant displayed a lack of accountability and insight into his 
criminal behaviors during the interview, and the absence of a documented release plan.  See 
Executive Law §§ 259-c(4), 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704; Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 
N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2014); Matter of Fuchino, 255 A.D.2d at 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d at 
390.  The Board encouraged him to enter and complete ART and Transitional Services 2 to gain 
insight, develop a documented release plan, and work with counselors to connect with and obtain 
letters of assurance from reentry programs that will assist with educational/vocational goals and 
 to support a successful transition back into the community.  See Executive 
Law §§ 259-c(4), 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 
445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018).  The Board acted within its discretion in 
determining these considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered 
discretionary release inappropriate at this time.   See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 
A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015). 
 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.”  
Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (quoting Matter of Russo v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
